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Although much is known regarding the antecedents and consequences of analyst scrutiny, very 
little attention has been paid to how analyst scrutiny is stimulated in a firm’s announcement and 
subsequently influences the market response to the announcement. Adopting a behavioral 
perspective of analyst scrutiny in M&A context, I examine how analyst scrutiny moderates the 
effects of deal attributes on the market response to deal announcements. To test this moderating 
effect on M&A performance, I decompose analyst scrutiny into two levels: the firm-level and the 
event-level, and suggest that event-level scrutiny occurs based on specific event attributes. 
Treating deal-level scrutiny as event-level scrutiny triggered by a firm’s rich media use for an 
M&A announcement, I propose that deal-level scrutiny will magnify the effects of both value-
positive and value-negative deal attributes on an acquirer’s market performance. A dataset of 783 
M&A announcements by S&P 500 companies from 2005 to 2011 supported the moderating 
effect of rich media use only on the relationship between a negative deal attribute, such as 
relative deal size, and an acquirer’s performance, but not on the relationship between two 
positive attributes, cash payment for a deal and industry relatedness, and performance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) are strategically important moves as well as constantly 
compelling research topics in various academic disciplines (Haleblian, Denvers, McNamara, 
Carpenter, & Davison, 2009). Finance scholars have paid attention to shareholder wealth 
creation and reduction, and strategic and behavioral literature has highlighted strategic fit, 
organizational fit, and the acquisition process in an effort to explain M&A performance 
(Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006). This proliferation of M&A studies has contributed to 
identification of the various factors related to M&A, such as antecedents of M&A, moderators of 
the M&A process, and its performance. However, there is still significant unexplained variance 
remaining in existing M&A performance studies (King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004). I 
propose that a behavioral perspective of managers’ announcements and consequent analyst 
scrutiny can account for at least some of this unexplained variance. Recently a growing body of 
research in behavioral finance, strategic management, and economic sociology has begun to 
criticize the efficient-markets hypothesis and bring the assumption of investor rationality into 
question. In line with this criticism, I further suggest that market response to M&A 
announcements could be better understood through the behavioral mechanisms underlying 
investors’ decision making. Assuming these investors’ perceptions of acquisitions are influenced 
by both managers’ announcements and analysts’ recommendations, this study especially focuses 
on analysts’ scrutiny occurring in a firm’s announcement. Although it is well known that the 
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analyst serves as an information intermediary and an external monitor, thus potentially affecting 
investors’ and firm managers’ decision making (Zuckerman, 1999, 2000; Benner, 2010; Benner 
& Ranganathan, 2012), we do not yet understand how analysts’ behavior, especially scrutiny, 
influences the impacts of a firm’s announcements on market responses. As one facet of analyst 
influence, I propose that analyst scrutiny at the event level moderates the effects of event 
attributes on the stock market reaction to a firm’s announcement. 
Scrutiny as ongoing and intense attention to the objects and close monitoring 
accompanied by frequent questions and interruptions (Sutton & Galunic, 1996) occurs when the 
target scrutinized has high visibility or uncertainty (e.g., Meznar & Nigh, 1995; Pfeffer, 1973; 
Wang, Choi, & Li, 2008; Langberg & Sivaramakrishnan, 2010). The greater benefits from 
information acquisition than the acquisition cost also attract analyst scrutiny (c.f. Lang, Lins, & 
Miller, 2004). When a firm announces events characterized by a high level of uncertainty and the 
possibility of agency problems, analysts tend to closely examine managers’ behaviors and 
intensely question them in order to make better forecasts of the event performance. Even though 
the analyst’s fierce scrutiny may cause managers to suffer from cognitive overload and negative 
affect due to the close monitoring, frequent interruptions and questioning, shareholders receive 
the benefits of the scrutiny, such as a reduction in the agency problem or a decrease in 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders (Gentry & Shen, 2013; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983).  
Existing literature on analyst scrutiny has considered it as a firm-level factorthat 
influences managers’ behaviors and firms’ strategic decisions (e.g., Gentry & Shen, 2013; Rao & 
Sivakumar, 1999; Zuckerman, 2000; Benson, Brau, Cicon, & Ferris, 2015). In the literature, 
authors indicate that the analysts’ high scrutiny on an overall firm influences its strategic 
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decisions, such as R&D investments, de-diversification and the establishment of investor 
relations departments. However, I suggest that analyst scrutiny occurs not only at the broader 
firm level, but also, more granularly, at the event level. For example, a given firm may receive 
greater scrutiny when it announces one event and less scrutiny when it announces another event; 
focusing only on firm-level scrutiny ignores this potential impact of the scrutiny induced by 
certain event types and attributes. Analyst scrutiny at the firm level may influence managers’ 
behaviors. For instance, it would be hard for managers facing intense scrutiny to act against 
shareholders’ interest or to withhold important information. While analyst scrutiny at the firm 
level is viewed as the scrutiny which the firm usually experiences regardless of any specific 
event or issue, analyst scrutiny at the event level can be generated from specific event-level 
attributes, for example, event contents, the recent performance of an announcing firm, or modes 
of an event announcement (e.g., Mayew & Venkatachalam, 2012).  
This research focuses on the moderating role of analyst scrutiny in M&A announcements 
since M&A is fundamentally characterized by a high level of uncertainty and ambiguity, and the 
possibility of agency problems and information asymmetry. M&A is also highly visible due to its 
uncommonness and significance. Specifically, I propose that the use of rich media for M&A 
announcements, such as conference calls and webcasts, triggers greater analyst scrutiny. When 
M&A deals are announced via rich media, analysts could inquire into all doubtful or unexplained 
points by directly asking managers during Q&A sessions. Compared to lean media, such as 8K 
filings or press releases, a manager’s rich media choice for the announcement has been known to 
be advantageous to both managers and other market participants: long-term reductions in 
information asymmetry, a decrease in dispersion among analysts’ opinions, lower costs of 
capital, and favorable market reactions to announcements (Brown, Hillegeist, & Lo, 2004; 
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Bowen, Davis, & Matsumoto, 2002; Kimbrough & Louis, 2011). While these many advantages 
of rich media have been highlighted in the existing literature, few studies have focused on 
possible disadvantages. Especially when an acquirer or a deal has negative attributes, such as 
stock payment for the target company or acquisition of a large target, how analyst scrutiny via 
rich media might occur and influence the investors’ decision making about the deal has not yet 
been examined. This study assumes that transparency in information disclosure enhanced by 
high analyst scrutiny would reveal all aspects of the deal and help investors and analysts to better 
understand and assess the deal. Therefore, I propose that not only the effect of value-positive 
attributes in a deal, but also the effect of value-negative attributes on market response would be 
strengthened when intense deal-level scrutiny occurs during conference calls or webcasts. 
The empirical setting for this research is S&P 500 companies’ 783 M&A announcements 
from 2005 to 2011. I first hypothesize the effects of deal attributes on the market responses to 
deal announcements as baseline hypotheses. Cash payment for acquisitions and industry 
relatedness as positive attributes, and relative deal size as a negative deal attribute are expected 
to be positively and negatively associated with acquirer’s cumulative abnormal stock return, 
respectively. Then I hypothesize the moderating effect of deal-level scrutiny - rich media use for 
the deal announcement - on two baseline hypotheses. OLS regression results show that rich 
media use strengthens only the negative effects of relative deal size on market response. These 
findings suggest that rich media choice for M&A announcements should be made with caution 
because announcements using conference calls or webcasts can elicit more adverse market 
reaction if a deal or a firm has some negative attributes. 
This work yields two contributions to the understanding of M&A contexts and analyst 
and manager behaviors in M&A announcements. First, this study attempts to fill the void in the 
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literature on the role of analysts and their monitoring effect. In the previous studies on analysts’ 
role, the impacts of analyst coverage and recommendation on firms’ strategies and performance 
have been largely studied (e.g., Rao & Sivakumar, 1999; Zuckerman, 2000; Benner & 
Ranganathan, 2012; Womack, 1996; Das, Guo, & Zhang, 2006). However, we know little about 
how analysts’ scrutiny as their aggressive monitoring behavior influences market responses to a 
firm’s M&A announcements, which are characterized by a high level of uncertainty and 
ambiguity. Besides positive outcomes of analyst scrutiny, such as a decrease in uncertainty, 
information asymmetry, or agency problem (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Gentry & Shen, 2013), this 
research especially focuses on the effect of increased transparency in the organization’s 
information environment due to analysts’ scrutiny. This increased transparency would clearly 
reveal all news, no matter whether it is positive or negative. Considering a manger’s rich media 
use for the announcement as the trigger for analysts’ intense scrutiny at the deal level, this paper 
contributes to behavioral strategy by improving the understanding of how managers’ media 
choice for event announcements induces analysts to more closely scrutinize the event and 
eventually influence a firm’s M&A performance. Second, this research decomposes analyst 
scrutiny into two levels: the firm-level and the event-level. Compared to the previous literature 
considering analyst scrutiny as a single level factor at the firm level and constant monitoring 
system, this paper proposes that the scrutiny should be viewed as separate critical forces at two 
levels and each level of scrutiny has different functions. Firm-level scrutiny measured by the 
number of analysts covering a firm influences a firm’s strategies, which would be aligned with 
shareholders’ interests (e.g., Gentry & Shen, 2013; Wright, Kroll, & Elenkov, 2002). By 
differentiating event-level scrutiny from firm-level scrutiny, I find that certain event attributes 
are more likely to attract high analyst scrutiny on the event above the analyst scrutiny on the 
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overall firm. In addition, this study shows that the analyst event-level scrutiny eventually impacts 
investors’ decision making regarding the event in the stock market. 
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II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
1. How Does Analyst Scrutiny Occur and Influence the Behaviors of Firms? 
Scrutiny is defined as ongoing and intense attention to an individual or an organization and close 
monitoring entailing frequent questions and interruptions (Sutton & Galunic, 1996). Firms are 
sometimes eager to attract public attention and manipulate it to their advantage, but sometimes 
the attention changes to severe scrutiny. Prior works have identified several antecedents which 
would arouse the analysts’ scrutiny of a focal firm. First, high visibility of a firm attracts more 
attention from external constituents. Level of visibility increases with firm size or age (Meznar & 
Nigh, 1995; Pfeffer, 1973; Wang, Choi, & Li, 2008), eye-catching events, such as IPO, a firm’s 
entry to regulated industry, and horizontal acquisitions (Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer, & Noah, 
2005; Dean & Brown, 1995; He, 2008; Welbourne & Andrews, 1996), publicity from large 
media coverage (Bansal, 2005), or a large deviation from expected performance (e.g., Sanders, 
2001; Mayew & Venkatachalam, 2012). Since the prominence of a focal firm or certain issues 
draws the high attention from external constituents, the firm or managers would experience high 
pressure to meet their expectations and face close observation of their behaviors by regulators, 
shareholders, market, press, or analysts. Second, scrutiny by investors or analysts occurs when 
there is a high level of uncertainty in a firm’s information disclosure. For example, managers’ 
announcements of good news with low levels of accuracy (Langberg & Sivaramakrishnan, 2008) 
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or a firm’s voluntary disclosure with forward-looking information (Langberg & 
Sivaramakrishnan, 2010) would increase market scrutiny. Market participants’ scrutiny, 
especially analysts’ scrutiny, about the firm is often triggered by this uncertainty underlying the 
information disclosed, in order to assess quality of information and make an appropriate 
interpretation of the future. Third, analysts scrutinize a firm or managers when information 
search cost is lower than the benefits from the search. Analysts play an important role as 
information intermediaries between firms and markets, and their reputations and compensations 
are determined based on the accuracy of their forecasts and recommendations. To increase this 
accuracy, analysts are willing to pay for the costs of information acquisition as long as the costs 
are lower than the benefits from the acquisition. Therefore, the extent of analyst scrutiny for 
information acquisition is influenced by the efficiency of the information environment 
surrounding the firm under scrutiny. A non-U.S. firm’s cross listing on U.S. stock exchanges 
increases analyst coverage of the firm (Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2003) and a firm’s concentrated 
ownership with incentives to withhold or manipulate information reduces the number of analysts 
following the firm (Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2004). When analysts make a decision to follow newly 
privatized firms in foreign markets, the decision will be influenced by level of political risk, 
judicial efficiency, information disclosure, and effectiveness of the legal institution in the focal 
country (Boubakri & Bouslimi, 2010). 
Scrutiny by stakeholders, such as public, boards, regulators, press, or analysts, influences 
a firm’s behaviors and strategic decisions since managers seek to conform to societal 
expectations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) or meet the performance 
expectations of a market (Gentry & Shen, 2013). There are two pathways that analyst scrutiny 
especially influences the firm’s behaviors: a decrease in agency problems and a reduction in 
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information asymmetry. From the agency theory perspective, managers are presumed to act in 
their own interests, which may not always be the best interests of the shareholders. For instance, 
one of the managerial motives for M&A may be the desire to decrease risk related to managerial 
human capital and to increase compensation, which are positively associated with an increase in 
firm size (Amihud & Lev, 1981). When a firm is highly scrutinized by analysts, however, 
managers tend to engage less in opportunistic behavior and the firm is less likely to experience 
the agency problem (Gentry & Shen, 2013; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Since analyst scrutiny works 
as an external monitoring mechanism, managers’ actions for self-interest or against shareholders’ 
interest could be easily caught, and then followed by severe interrogation by analysts. This 
pressure from analysts eventually affects a manager’s behavior and strategic decisions. 
According to Gentry and Shen (2013)’s study, when a firm’s performance had not met the 
analysts’ forecasts, managers tended to cut R&D expenses in the following year. In their study, 
however, the firm’s R&D intensity slightly increased when analyst coverage is high. Wright, 
Kroll, and Elenkov’s (2002) research specifically shows how external monitoring activities 
influence the effect of M&A outcomes on CEO compensation. Their empirical results show that 
M&A returns are associated with changes in CEO compensation when external monitoring by 
analysts, institutional investors, and independent board members are vigilant while an increase in 
firm size leads to compensation changes when the acquirer is passively monitored. Another 
influence of analyst scrutiny on the firm’s behavior is found through the reduction in information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Analysts tend to prefer the firms or industries 
with low costs of information acquisition, where they could efficiently detect and process the 
information (e.g., Rao & Sivakumar, 1999; Zuckerman, 2000). Thus firms might create 
transparent information environments in an effort to help analysts’ acquisition and proper 
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interpretation of the information about the firm. For instance, severe scrutiny by outside 
directors, large institutional investors, specialist auditors, or analysts influences a firm’s 
behaviors by decreasing the possibility of a firm’s concealment of negative outcomes or 
increasing the firm’s use of transparent reporting formats (Abrahamson & Park, 1994; Lee, 
Petroni, & Shen, 2006). Such enhanced transparency in information disclosure plays an 
important role in reducing the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. By 
retaining this transparency in managers’ interaction with shareholders and analysts, managers 
expect to induce market’s favorable perceptions of the firm or their decisions, which would 
eventually lead to better firm performance and higher firm valuation (Fombrun, Gardberg, & 
Barnett, 2000; Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2003).  
While previous literature described how analyst scrutiny occurs and influences the 
behaviors of firms and managers exclusively at the firm-level, I propose that there might be 
another level of analyst scrutiny: at the event level. The extant studies on analyst scrutiny as a 
firm-level factor have considered analyst scrutiny as analyst coverage or analyst following, and 
‘covering’ or ‘following’ generally means analysts’ activity to issue the firm’s earnings forecast 
(e.g., Farrell & Whidbee, 2003; Gentry & Shen, 2013; Rao & Sivakumar, 1999). Therefore, 
analyst scrutiny is generally measured by the number of analysts issuing the firm’s annual or 
quarterly earnings forecast (e.g., Gentry & Shen, 2013; Zuckerman, 2000; Rao & Sivakumar, 
1999). However, it is very unlikely that regardless of event types–earnings release, CEO 
turnover, strategic alliance, M&A, divestiture, new product development, and so on, or event 
attributes–value-positive or value-negative, the effects and the degree of analyst scrutiny on each 
corporate event or event outcome are almost same as long as the number of analysts following 
the firm does not change. The significance levels of individual events are all different in a 
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company. Some events might attract a high level of scrutiny, but others do not. For instance, in 
cases that the event is characterized of a lot of uncertainty or its expected outcome is not 
consistent with shareholders’ interests, analysts might more closely scrutinize the firm. When 
firms make high strategic investments during the period of uncertain technological change, they 
might feel more pressure from analysts who believe the investments will not create shareholder 
value (Benner & Ranganathan, 2012). Therefore, I argue that besides the firm-specific scrutiny, 
each of a firm’s events receives granular scrutiny at the event level. The effects of this additional 
event-level scrutiny depend on the event details, especially positive or negative attributes, which 
are closely associated with event-related performance. In the next section, I highlight how 
analyst event-level scrutiny critically functions in M&A context and moderates the relationship 
between deal attributes and acquirer performance. 
2. Event attributes and a firm’s market performance 
Before I turn to the roles and impacts of analyst’s scrutiny in M&A context, first, I provide a 
baseline proposition and hypotheses describing the relationship between event attributes and a 
firm’s market performance. Strategy scholars have been interested in explaining what industry, 
firm, or individual factors help a firm outperform its rivals. Although there is no single absolute 
factor leading to a firm’s financial success in the market, diverse event attributes accounting for 
some portion of financial success have been identified, for example, strategic alliance of firms 
with a dedicated alliance function (Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002), overseas acquisitions by 
emerging-economy firms (Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, & Chittoor, 2010), gender effects in CEO 
appointment (Lee & James, 2007), early and fast mover effects in new product introduction (Lee, 
Smith, Grimm & Schomburg, 2000) or methods of payment in M&A (Travlos, 1987; Chang, 
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1998). The empirical results from these studies show that certain event attributes significantly 
influence a firm’s financial performance after the effects of other attributes are controlled. This 
argument leads to the following proposition: 
 (Baseline) Proposition 1. Event attributes are associated with the firm’s market 
performance on the event announcement date.  
 
M&A is an uncertain and ambiguous corporate event to investors because of information 
asymmetry between managers and investors, forward-looking statements used in the 
announcement, and the possibility of multiple interpretations of the focal deal. M&A is not a 
common or regular event, so it would be highly visible to market participants. In addition, 
managers in acquiring firms tend to voluntarily provide investors and analysts with deal-relevant 
information and actively communicate with them in order to reduce the uncertainty perceived by 
the market. Their efforts to voluntarily communicate through M&A announcements may 
contribute to the transparency in their information environment, which analysts prefer. Due to a 
high level of uncertainty and visibility underlying M&A, and ease of information acquisition 
during its announcement, I consider M&A as an appropriate context to examine the effect of 
analyst event-level scrutiny. 
In the following hypotheses, I adopt three deal attributes as a best illustration of value-
positive and value-negative attributes leading to positive and negative M&A performance: 
relative deal size, method of payment, and industry relatedness between an acquirer and a target. 
These three variables were chosen from the variable lists of the 70 most cited M&A papers in 
Google Scholar. In those 70 papers, payment type is most often used (in 15 out of 70 papers), 
followed by relative acquirer size to target size (10 papers), acquiring firm size (9 papers), and 
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relatedness (8 papers). Relative deal size was selected as the best example of value-negative 
attributes and calculated by an acquirer’s size divided by transaction value size. This is because 
two factors, an acquirer’s firm size and transaction value involving acquisition premium and 
target size, are the typical examples of value-negative attributes of M&A deal (Moeller, 
Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004; Kusewitt, 1985). Method of payment (cash payment) and industry 
relatedness are the most often used deal attributes as value-positive according to the variable list. 
Therefore, I chose these three variables as best suited to illustrate value-negative and value-
positive attributes of a deal. 
Large relative deal size, i.e., large transaction value compared to an acquirer’s market 
value, means either paying a high acquisition premium or acquiring a large target compared to 
acquirer size. The amount of acquisition premium could be influenced by managerial hubris 
(Hayward & Hambrick, 1997) and acquisition of the large firm might be related to a top 
manager’s incentive plan. Due to managerial hubris, acquiring managers believe that they can 
extract much value from the M&A (Roll, 1986) and tend to pay larger acquisition premiums in 
order to complete the offer. This overpayment for deal completion may cause negative post-
merger performance of acquirers (Lubatkin, 1983; Varaiya & Ferris, 1987). In addition, the value 
created from acquisition can be considered as the amount of expected acquisition synergies 
which acquisition premium is subtracted from (Bruner, 2004; Sirower, 1997). The higher the 
premium paid, the smaller the value creation potential. From the acquirer shareholders’ 
perspective, this would lead to their wealth reduction, which they do not want. Furthermore, 
from the moment the M&A deal is done, participating firms have responsibility to commit a 
certain amount of resources and investment specified in the agreement, no matter what will 
happen in the future. Thus, larger deals might result in acquirers’ greater future risks, which will 
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be perceived by market participants. Kusewitt (1985) empirically verified the negative 
relationship between relative size of target to acquirer and both accounting ROA and market 
return. Similarly, Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz (2004) showed that the bulk of M&A-driven 
value destruction was concentrated in large deals. Due to the possibility of managerial hubris, 
large dollar loss, and greater future risks, the uncertainty perceived by investors would increase 
when a firm makes larger deals. This perceived uncertainty would negatively influence 
investors’ decision making. Therefore, I first hypothesize: 
(Baseline) Hypothesis 1a. Relative deal size compared to acquirer size is negatively 
associated with an acquirer’s stock market return on the deal announcement date. 
 
Empirical studies in accounting and finance fields show that bidders’ cash offers lead to 
their positive market performance on the deal announcement date (e.g., Myers & Majluf, 1984; 
Travlos, 1987; Brown & Ryngaert, 1991). A bidding firm’s managers prefer a stock offer when 
their stocks are overvalued by target firm’s shareholders, but they offer cash when they believe 
their firm is undervalued (Myers & Majluf, 1984). In a market, accordingly, a cash offer is 
considered as a good signal that post-M&A performance would be positive. When the signal is 
reflected in an acquirer’s market value, the acquirer’s stock price will rise. 
(Baseline) Hypothesis 1b. Cash payment for a deal is positively associated with an 
acquirer’s stock market return on the deal announcement date. 
 
When a firm acquires a target operating in the same or a similar industry, familiarity with 
the target industry increases the acquirers’ capability to leverage their existing resources in the 
target’s operations, reduces the need for the acquirer to learn businesses and industries of a 
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target, and facilitates the post-merger integration process (Hitt, Harrison, & Ireland, 2001; 
Roberts & Berry, 1985). Numerous M&A studies empirically show that acquiring a related target 
positively influences acquisition performance in terms of both acquirers’ financial return and 
accounting return (Bettis & Hall, 1982; Kusewitt, 1985; Singh & Montgomery, 1987; Palich, 
Cardinal, & Miller, 2000). Therefore, industry relatedness between acquirers and targets would 
lead to the positive market response to the M&A announcement by attracting a ‘buy’ decision of 
investors. Here I posit hypothesis 1b:  
(Baseline) Hypothesis 1c. Industry relatedness between acquirer and target is positively 
associated with an acquirer’s stock market return on the deal announcement date. 
3. Event-level Analyst Scrutiny  
Analyst scrutiny at the event level may be triggered by diverse event attributes. Event-specific 
uncertainty, the possibility of agency problems regarding events, or the efficiency in an 
environment of event information might increase or decrease analyst scrutiny about the event. In 
this research, I propose this analyst scrutiny triggered by certain event attributes will moderate 
how markets perceive and respond to a particular event. As one of such attributes, managers 
make a media choice for an event announcement among various communication channels, such 
as news releases, conference calls, webcasts, and shareholder meetings. According to media 
richness theory (Daft & Lengel, 1984, 1986; Daft, Lengel, & Trevino, 1987), communication 
messages should be delivered through channels with sufficient and appropriate media richness 
capacities in order to deal with uncertainty and equivocality underlying situations, and 
consequently improve communication and task performance. Each medium can be ranked on a 
richness continuum, depending on its capacity for delivering information and cues, highlighting 
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the details and providing receivers (in this case, analysts) with opportunities to directly interact 
with managers. Daft and Lengel (1986) suggest that rich media, such as face-to-face meetings 
and telephone conversations, are suitable for equivocal situations while lean media, such as 
written documents, are better suited for resolving uncertainty. If messages are announced on 
channels that are inappropriate to either the equivocality of a situation or the richness of the 
information to be transmitted, receivers may misinterpret the intended purpose or the meanings 
(Trevino, Lengel, & Daft, 1987; Trevino, Lengel, Bodensteiner, Gerloff, & Muir, 1990). In the 
research of media synchronicity theory (Dennis & Valacich, 1999; Dennis, Fuller, & Valacich, 
2008), authors argue that communication performance depends on a fit between primary 
processes of communication, conveyance and convergence, and the level of media synchronicity 
which is influenced by five capabilities, such as symbol sets, parallelism, transmission velocity, 
rehearsability, and reprocessability. According to this theory, using high synchronicity media for 
convergence process would lead to better communication performance. Appendix A shows how 
different channels are arrayed along a media richness continuum and discusses current 
controversies about media richness theory. 
Before event announcements, firms will choose a medium to transparently and 
unequivocally disclose the event-related information and to facilitate shared understanding of its 
potential for value creation among market participants. In an effort to get the word out, managers 
often supplement a mandatory SEC filing with additional disclosures through lean media such as 
news releases and/or through rich media such as conference calls and webcasts. Especially 
conference call users could deliver more information and emphasize specific event details, 
compared to non-conference call users (Kimbrough & Louis, 2011). Therefore, managers would 
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additionally choose rich media for event announcements in order to “strategically” highlight 
positive or supportive aspects that help them make their case. 
Announcements using rich media, however, would also provide analysts with an 
opportunity to scrutinize the event more closely. Analysts usually scrutinize firms when the cost 
of monitoring or acquiring information is lower than its benefit. In event announcements, 
managers provide relevant information and suggest appropriate interpretation frames to help 
investors and analysts’ information processing about the event. Since the enactment of 
Regulation Fair Disclosure
1
 in 2000, if a firm discloses significant information to analysts or 
institutional investors, the firm should simultaneously disseminate the information to all market 
participants. Therefore, firms may choose rich media (conference calls/ webcasts) to release the 
information to all of analysts and investors at the same time at low cost. During rich media 
announcements, analysts directly ask questions to mangers or require additional information. 
This direct interaction lowers analysts’ cost for monitoring and information acquisition. 
Considering the high visibility of conference calls/webcasts and the low cost of information 
acquisition, I suggest that a public firm’s event announcement using rich media heightens event-
level scrutiny. 
                                                 
1 Excerpt from “Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading” (Reg FD) 
“As a general matter, acceptable methods of public disclosure for purposes of Regulation FD will include press releases distributed through a 
widely circulated news or wire service, or announcements made through press conferences or conference calls that interested members of the 
public may attend or listen to either in person, by telephonic transmission, or by other electronic transmission (including use of the Internet). The 
public must be given adequate notice of the conference or call and the means for accessing it. The regulation does not require use of a particular 
method, or establish a "one size fits all" standard for disclosure; rather, it leaves the decision to the issuer to choose methods that are reasonably 
calculated to make effective, broad, and non-exclusionary public disclosure, given the particular circumstances of that issuer. Indeed, we have 
modified the language of the regulation to note that the issuer may use a method "or combination of methods" of disclosure, in recognition of the 
fact that it may not always be possible or desirable for an issuer to rely on a single method of disclosure as reasonably designed to effect broad 
public disclosure.” 
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Based on the argument on transparency in information disclosure, I propose a 
moderating effect of rich media use as event-level scrutiny on the relationship between event 
attributes and market response. In other words, the degree of event attribute effects on market 
response would change, depending on the extent of event-level scrutiny, since intense analyst 
scrutiny leads to more extensive disclosure and higher transparency in information environment. 
As a result of fierce scrutiny, the effects of value-positive or value-negative event attributes on 
event performance would be strengthened. During the Q&A section of conference calls or 
webcasts, analyst scrutiny will reveal and magnify the positive sides of an event, but also 
potentially uncover and confirm its negative sides. 
Proposition 2. Analyst scrutiny at the event level moderates the effects of event attributes 
on the firm’s market performance. 
4. Deal-level Analyst Scrutiny in M&A Context  
In the M&A context, analysts’ event-level scrutiny occurs at each deal. Analysts perceive 
various deal-level uncertainty and risks, depending on an acquirer’s situation, target firm 
attributes and deal contents. Besides the uncertainty inherent in each deal, it is well known that a 
vast majority of deals would not bring material and significant returns to acquiring firm 
shareholders (Bruner, 2002). In addition, top managers face two significant challenges in M&A 
announcements. First, investors are highly skeptical of promised synergies because of the 
potential agency problems and information asymmetry between shareholders and managers. The 
second challenge is the diversity of stakeholder stances, which will lead to individuals’ disparate 
speculations about what would occur and change by the deal. The same announcement content 
can be, therefore, differently interpreted depending on the stakeholders’ perspectives. Due to 
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these challenges, the roles of analyst as an information intermediary and a monitoring system are 
greatly highlighted in the information environment around M&A announcements. 
To briefly explain the information environment around a firm’s announcement in M&A 
contexts, I consider three parties to be key players influencing dynamic information processing 
in the stock market: a firm’s top managers, financial analysts, and investors. Top managers 
provide investors and analysts with relevant information about the deal. For example, the CEO or 
CFO provides them with transaction-related information, such as deal rationale, expectations for 
future synergies, financing, regulatory approvals and the M&A implementation process. In an 
effort to effectively and widely disseminate the information and meet the communication goal, 
firm managers choose appropriate media for the M&A announcements. The information 
delivered through the media is expected to lead to a shared understanding of potential value 
creation, and then to allay investors’ concerns regarding the deal. The delivery of information is 
intended to eventually influence analysts’ evaluation of the focal deal and investors’ decision 
making. Financial analysts collect information from published reports or announcements by the 
firm, process it and subsequently share their expert opinions with investors through analysis 
reports. Based on the analysis results, they make specific recommendations on the firm’s stock 
(strong buy, buy, hold, or sell). When managers attempt to influence the other market 
participants’ decision making by voluntarily providing information, analysts’ scrutiny might be 
greater. This is because analysts’ reputations and compensations are determined based on the 
accuracy of their forecasts and recommendations, and firms’ announcements could be a good 
opportunity for them to monitor firms and acquire more information at low cost. Mayew, Sharp, 
and Venkatachalam (2013) found that initial annual earnings forecasts offered by analysts 
participating in conference calls are more accurate and timelier, compared to nonparticipating 
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analysts’ forecasts. In order to increase their forecast accuracy, analysts elicit private or hidden 
information and intensely scrutinize the firm to detect managers’ motivation and intention behind 
the deal. Investors in turn assess the profitability of the deal, relying on a firm’s announcement 
and/or on analyst’s reports. After the assessment, they decide to buy, hold, or sell that stock. The 
three parties’ information processing, decision and action play crucial roles in setting the stock 
price of the announcing firm: if investors like what they hear or see in an acquiring firm’s M&A 
announcement or they follow analysts’ strong recommendation of the announcing firm’s stock, 
they will buy or hold the stock of the firm. This investment decision will drive stock prices up 
and create shareholder wealth (Madhavan & Prescott, 1995). On the other hand, if investors are 
not induced by what a manager announces or analysts do not recommend the firm, they will sell 
the stock of the acquiring firm and the acquiring firm’s stock prices will go down. Figure 1 
shows these information processing flows among the three key players and the role of analyst 
scrutiny during M&A announcements. In the following section, I examine how the deal-level 
scrutiny influences the relationship between deal attributes and market response to the deal 
announcement. 
 
 
Figure 1. Information processing flows during M&A announcements  
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5. Moderating Effects of Deal-level Analyst Scrutiny  
When the acquiring firm announces a deal with certain negative attributes such as large relative 
deal size, it tends to heighten the extent of analysts’ attention due to its high visibility and risk. 
Therefore, managers’ rich media use for the announcements could be positively associated with 
the possibility for analysts to closely examine the deal details and directly ask about the 
motivation of the deal, especially which includes value destroying attributes. Open conference 
calls make immediate and broad dissemination of news, regardless of whether the news is 
beneficial to the announcing firm or not. Negative or uncertain deal details will result in harsher 
interrogation and managers’ defensive responses, if any, will be immediately detected by 
analysts. Hollander, Pronk, and Roelofsen (2010) examined that managers’ silence in not directly 
answering analysts’ question or their reluctance to answer can be negatively interpreted by the 
market as signaling bad news or withholding information, eventually leading to discounted stock. 
The bad impression resulting from a previous analyst’s question might be also reinforced by 
triggering follow-up questions from other analysts. This echo effect would begin with one 
analyst’s cynical question, managers’ suspicious behavior implying that they might withhold 
information, or mangers’ inability to defend the deal against negative comments by analysts. 
Since then, the mood of conference call could be altered and following analysts may keep raising 
unfavorable questions. These analysts’ behaviors can be explained in diverse ways, such as 
imitating (Rao, Greve, & Davis, 2001), signaling (Scharfstein & Stein, 1990), and herding 
(Welch, 2000; DeBondt & Forbes, 1999; Kim & Pantzalis, 2003). The bad signals generated 
during the announcements through conference calls/webcasts will spread out very quickly and 
broadly through the huge audience base. Sirower and Lipin (2003: 23) said “many companies 
have discovered it’s hard to put the genie back in the bottle once a deal gets a bad reception.” 
 22 
The negative factors discovered and emphasized by analysts would be followed by the market’s 
concerns about future expected earnings of the firm. Therefore, I hypothesize that the effect of 
negative deal attributes on the market’s response will be exacerbated when the deal is announced 
through rich media and the deal-level scrutiny increases. Thus: 
Hypothesis 2a. Analyst scrutiny at the deal level will strengthen the negative effect of 
relative deal size on an acquirer’s stock market return on a deal announcement date. 
 
When a deal includes value-positive deal attributes and it is announced via conference 
call or webcasts, the moderating effect of analyst scrutiny at the deal level will be also positive. 
Managers could directly highlight and widely broadcast good sides of the deal during a 
presentation section or indirectly disseminate the information by answering analysts’ follow-up 
questions. Analysts’ favorable evaluations about the deal or positive reactions to managers’ 
decisions will quickly reach a broad audience. Even when analysts interrogate managers about 
deal details, managers could handle the situation by treating it as another opportunity to 
emphasize the positives. Uncertainty perceived by investors will diminish after the well-managed 
conference call with informative presentations and a corroborating Q&A session. Therefore, 
conference call use as a proxy of deal-level scrutiny has a positive moderating effect on the 
relationship between positive deal attributes, such as cash payment for a deal and industry 
relatedness, and market response to the announcement. 
Hypothesis 2b. Analyst scrutiny at the deal level will strengthen the positive effect of cash 
payment on an acquirer’s stock market return on a deal announcement date. 
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Hypothesis 2c. Analyst scrutiny at the deal level will strengthen the positive effect of 
industry relatedness on an acquirer’s stock market return on a deal announcement date. 
 
Figure 2 depicts the hypothesized model of analyst deal-level scrutiny as a moderator 
between two deal attributes and an acquirer’s performance. 
 
 
Figure 2. Analyst scrutiny at deal-level as moderator 
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III. METHODS 
1. Data and Sample  
The sample consists of publicly disclosed acquisitions by U.S. S&P 500 companies for the seven 
years 2005 through 2011. I focused on S&P 500 companies’ M&A announcements because the 
investment community gives greater attention to large firms, such as S&P 500, Fortune 500, or 
NYSE-listed firms (Baker, Powell, & Weaver, 1999), such that their announcements will not be 
neglected and the effects of their announcement can be appropriately reflected in analysts’ 
evaluations and shareholders’ investment decisions. In addition to this visibility issue, small 
firms’ conference call for M&A might bring unusual attention from investors and analysts to 
their announcement since it does not commonly happen in small firms. The impact of their 
announcement medium choices could be biased due to this attention effect. Thus, I included S&P 
500 firm’s deal announcements in the sample, especially when those firms were on the list of 
S&P 500 index. If there is a time period while a company was out of the list, I did not count its 
deal announcements during that time. I also dropped the companies that went bankrupt, were 
acquired, or went private when the data was collected. I finally identified 693 U.S. non-finance 
acquirers listed during this period on S&P 500. 
I collected data on all M&A deals by those 693 companies from the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) and screened the announcements to ensure that (1) no other M&A 
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announcements occurred on the same date and the next date, (2) there were no other major 
announcements on the M&A announcement date, (3) stock repurchase (buyback) was not 
included, and (4) multiple documented deals between the same acquirer and the same target are 
considered to be only a single deal. I also dropped the observations which have another deal 
announcement on the next date in order to reduce any mixed effects between two deals. To 
control for deal-related, firm-related, and industry-related factors, I also screened out M&A deals 
which did not provide full financial and accounting information about the deals and the 
acquirers. The final sample consisted of 784 M&A announcements by 255 companies in 134 
industries. Data on M&A announcement dates and several deal related control variables 
(discussed below) came from the SDC database for 2005-2011. The announcement media used 
by acquirers were confirmed via Thomson One database. Acquirers’ financial and accounting 
data were obtained from Compustat, and daily market return data from Eventus. 
2. Measures  
2.1. Dependent Variable and Independent Variables 
Acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return The dependent variable is the stock market response 
to the acquirer’s M&A announcement. The event study method was used to measure cumulative 
abnormal returns on the announcement date as the market response. This methodology has been 
widely used in M&A research in strategy (e.g., Uhlenbruck, Hitt, & Semadeni, 2006; 
McNamara, Haleblian, & Dykes, 2008). This study focuses on deal announcements and the 
subsequent analyst scrutiny as behavioral factors which could affect the market reaction to the 
M&A deal. There are several reasons that cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) from the event 
study are the appropriate measure for the market response in this paper. First, to test the 
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announcement effect, the assumption that stock market reaction presages the actual outcomes of 
an M&A deal is not necessary. The event study method provides this research with a proper way 
of testing differences in market response to M&A announcements across deals, after controlling 
for other deal-related, firm-related, and industry-related factors. In addition, only abnormal 
returns surrounding the event announcement are immediately reflected in the event study output 
if the length of the event window is sufficiently short. It is less likely to be affected by many 
confounding factors, such as any negative/positive news of the firm’s current business as well as 
other strategic decisions which may affect its performance.  
 Cumulative abnormal returns for all acquirers in this study were obtained by using 
Eventus via the Wharton Research Data Services website. For event studies, Eventus uses data 
collected directly from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) stock databases or pre-
extracted from any other sources. The event window was established as the day of the event and 
the next day (Day 0 to 1). To achieve accurate results, I confirmed the date on which the M&A 
announcements were really made by comparing the announcement dates collected from the SDC 
database to the news release dates from Thomson One or conference call dates from the 
Bloomberg database. Announcement dates of 9 cases were different from the announcement 
dates collected from the SDC database. Conference call or webcast dates of 29 cases were 
different from their news release dates. I chose the news release dates or the conference 
call/webcast dates verified by Thomson One or Bloomberg database because those are the dates 
on which announcements were really made and the event study can capture the valid effects of 
announcement media choice on that day. Ordinary Least Squares was used as the estimation 
method because all acquirer firms are S&P 500 companies so there is less likelihood that thinly 
traded securities could be underreported when large differences exist in the volumes traded of 
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stocks in the sample (cf. Peterson, 1989). The Patell test was used to mitigate the cross-sectional 
correlation (Patell, 1976) and the CRSP value weighted index is used as the proxy for the market 
in the market model. 
To avoid extreme values that might result from unusual circumstances, for a dependent 
variable, acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return, I excluded outliers that were beyond four 
standard deviations from the yearly means. This eliminated 3 observations, approximately 0.38% 
of the total sample.  
 Relative deal size Relative deal size as an independent variable was measured by the 
ratio of total transaction value to the buyer’s pre-announcement market value as of the beginning 
of the fiscal year. This variable was created as the natural logarithm of the original values. 
 Cash payment is a continuous variable measured by the proportion of cash in the deal. 
The cash payment may signal to investors that post-acquisition performance will be positive 
(King et al., 2004), and eventually lead to positive market reaction to the deal announcement. 
Since the original value is highly skewed, cash-paid deal was measured as the natural logarithm 
of the original values. 
 Industry relatedness Related acquisitions enable the acquirer to achieve cost savings 
through divestiture or redundant assets (Capron, 1999) and to facilitate learning from the 
acquisition process (Hitt, Harrison, & Ireland, 2001). Due to these potential synergies between 
acquirers and targets, investors may more highly value related acquisition than unrelated 
acquisition. After reviewing diverse measurements for the construct, industry relatedness, in the 
previous literature, I was convinced that the SIC code-based measurement for the dummy 
variable might be the appropriate way to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of my model 
test and reflect analysts’ perspectives on ‘industry relatedness’. First of all, the majority of 
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previous studies have used SIC codes to measure industry relatedness as a categorical or a 
continuous variable. Of 48 papers with this construct published in Strategic Management 
Journal, 31 papers used SIC codes (or NAICS codes) for the variable, such as industry 
relatedness, business similarity, or type of acquisition (e.g., Hayward & Shimizu, 2006; Kroll, 
Wright, Toombs, & Leavell, 1997; Villalonga & McGahan, 2005; Laamanen & Keil, 2008). 
Several alternatives have been also introduced in existing research. Some papers used the list of 
patent numbers appearing in both an acquirer’s knowledge base and a target’s knowledge base to 
measure technology relatedness or knowledge relatedness (e.g., Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Grimpe & 
Hussinger, 2014; Makri, Hitt, & Lane, 2010). Others used customer similarity to measure market 
relatedness (e.g., Homburg & Bucerius, 2006). Capron, Mitchell, and Swaminathan (2001) 
collected the data through a survey to see how managers perceive the extent of business 
similarity between acquiring firms and targets. Park (2003) and Seth (1990) used the Federal 
Trade Commission typology for the classification of M&A type. Considering the diversity of 
firms and industries in my sample (134 industries from S&P 500 list) and the large sample size 
collected from 2005 to 2011 (783 deals by 255 acquirers), however, I decided that using a 
dummy variable would be the most efficient way to operationalize industry relatedness. Second, 
in the previous literature studying security analysts’ roles in the financial market or their impacts 
on the firm’s market performance, industries were classified using firms’ SIC code. Westphal 
and Graebner (2010) used a two-digit SIC code to measure diversified acquisitions when they 
studied how CEOs manage the impressions of analysts. Zuckerman (2000) chose a three digit 
SIC industry code as the level of analysis to test the impact of securities analysts’ industry 
specialization on the firm’s de-diversification strategy. To account for industry competition, Luo, 
Wang, Raithel, and Zheng (2015) used SIC codes to define the industry in which firms compete 
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and posited that corporate social performance information is reflected in security analyst’s 
recommendation, which influences general investors’ decision making. To explain the effect of 
analyst research on unrelated spun-off subsidiaries, four digit SIC codes were used to indicate 
the unrelatedness between spun-off units and their parent firms (Feldman, Gilson, & Villalonga, 
2014). 
Following Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990)’s research, I measured industry 
relatedness between acquirer and target using the four-digit SIC codes of the six main lines of 
business (by sales) in which the acquirer and target operate. If the firm operates in fewer than six 
4-digit industries, all its industries were used. If the acquirer and the target have at least one 4-
digit sic code in common among the top six lines of business, the deal was coded as “related.” 
Otherwise, the deal was coded as “unrelated.” This is the widely used measurement for the 
construct, ‘industry relatedness’ (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 
1999; McNamara, Haleblian, & Dykes, 2008) and the most appropriate way, considering the 
large size of firms in the sample, which implies that they have diverse business segments. In this 
case, there could be potential business overlaps that acquirers and targets operate in the same 
industry, but the industry might not be their primary focus. Therefore, this could be the inclusive 
and effective method to consider various main lines of business for industry relatedness 
measurement, especially when the sample includes large size firms.  
Although it was not chosen for this study, there could be an alternative way of 
measuring industry relatedness based on SIC code. It is a continuous measure to indicate the 
extents of relatedness: in terms of the primary SIC code, if the acquiring firm and target shared 
the first two digits, a score of 2 was assigned, if they shared the first three digits, a score of 4 was 
assigned, and if they shared all four digits, a score of 6 was assigned. If they shared any of the 
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SIC codes other than the primary SIC code, ‘relatedness’ was scored as 1 assuming a two-digit 
match, 2 if there was a three-digit match, and 3 was assigned if there was a four-digit match 
(Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Kroll, Walters, & Wright, 2008; Laamanen, Brauer, & Junna, 
2014; Laamanen & Keil, 2008). This continuous measure is significantly positively correlated 
with my dichotomous measure (p < .001). The OLS model with this continuous measure shows 
the same results with the model’s results including the original dichotomous measure. 
2.2. Moderator 
Deal-level analyst scrutiny (Rich media choice) This is a binary variable that takes the value of 
1 when the acquirer used rich media for the deal announcement, such as webcasts or conference 
calls, and 0 otherwise. All 784 deal announcements were verified in the database and it indicated 
that rich media were used for 213 announcements. 
2.3. Control Variables 
Differences in the acquirer’s M&A returns can be attributed to differences in the characteristics 
of the acquirer, the deal, and the target. To control for those attributes, I included several control 
variables.  
Acquirer attributes 
Firm-level analyst scrutiny was measured by the number of analysts following the 
acquirer. Since deal-level scrutiny is considered as the scrutiny of special events which is added 
to firm-level scrutiny a firm usually experiences, this variable was controlled to see the effect of 
only deal-level scrutiny. From the I/B/E/S detail history, this variable was measured as the 
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number of analysts issuing yearly earnings per share forecasts during the fiscal quarter in which 
the deal is announced. This variable was created as the natural logarithm of the original values. 
Book to market ratio was measured as the ratio of the acquirer's book value to its market value of 
equity as of the beginning of the fiscal year in which the deal is announced. This ratio represents 
the acquisition probability of the firm as well as valuations of the firm's assets (Gaur, Malhotra, 
& Zhu, 2013) and it could be negatively associated with bidder returns (Lang, Stulz, & Walkling, 
1989). Acquirer market value was measured as a proxy of the acquirer size by calculating the 
natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year in which the 
deal is announced. The acquirer size is negatively correlated with the bidders’ stock market 
return since large firms are more likely to pay more acquisition premium or to complete the deal 
due to large firms’ hubris (Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004). Pre-acquisition firm 
profitability was measured by subtracting the median industry ROA value from the firm-level 
ROA value measured in the fiscal year before an acquisition year. The existing research shows 
that firms with better financial performance make better acquisitions (Morck et al., 1990). In the 
previous literature, Acquirer slack has shown the mixed results of the relationship with 
acquisition performance. Hitt, Harrison, and Ireland (2001) indicated that more slack led to less 
costly debt financing, which is related to success of acquisitions. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling 
(1991) found that a firm with less slack is less likely to make an unprofitable acquisition due to 
lack of cash to spend. To control for the effect of acquirer slack, following Hayward and 
Hambrick (1997), I measured acquirer slack using the ratio of the acquirer’s current assets 
divided by its current liabilities and used it in the form of the log of its value. Deal experience 
from past deals may facilitate the processes for the target identification (Hitt, Harrison, Ireland, 
& Best, 1998) and integration of acquired firm resources, which may improve M&A 
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performance (King et al., 2004). In addition, managers with lack of acquisition experience are 
susceptible to escalation of commitment, which will be associated with high M&A costs 
(Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). This variable was measured as the total number of acquisitions 
undertaken by an acquirer in the previous 5 years before the deal was announced. 
Acquirer_Hightech industry was created as a categorical variable with an acquirer’s primary 
two-digit SIC code to control for any acquirer’s industry-specific attributes. 1 was coded for 
firms with SIC codes of 28, 35, 36, 73, or 87, and 0 otherwise. Acquirer_Industry profitability 
was measured by 3-year average returns on assets (ROA) of the primary three-digit SIC industry 
of an acquirer in the fiscal year before an acquisition year (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993). This 
variable would control the effects of industry-level profitability on the acquirer’s performance.  
Target attributes 
Target_Public was coded as 1when the target is a public company, and 0 otherwise. The 
direct effect of target firm types, such as private, public or subsidiary, on the stock market 
response depends on payment type, cash or stock (Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002). 
Crossborder deal was measured to control the effect of the target’s location. I made a dummy 
variable, called ‘Target_Foreign’ that takes the value of 1 if the target is located outside of the 
U.S., and 0 otherwise. This variable captures the possibility that domestic investors lack 
visibility in foreign firms (Covrig, Lau, & Ng, 2006) and investors’ uncertainty and skepticism 
might increase with this lack of visibility (Kimbrough & Louis, 2011).  
Deal attributes 
Year of transaction is a dummy variable for each of the years in my sample (2005-2011) 
in order to control for temporal effects on the deal performance.  
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3. Data Analysis  
Since the data were collected at the deal level, the firm level, and the industry level, I developed 
a multilevel model of analysts’ deal-level scrutiny effect on market response. However, intra-
class correlation coefficients (ICC) were very small in all three types of multilevel models: deal 
level and firm level as a two-level model, deal level and industry level as a two-level model, and 
deal level, firm level and industry level as a three-level model (See Appendix B). Based on these 
small ICCs, it is assumed that the dependent variable, an acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return, 
differs neither across the firm-level nor across the industry level and there is not a good deal of 
intra-firm or intra-industry homogeneity. Therefore, I decided to use ordinary least-squares 
(OLS) analysis to test the influence of deal attributes on the market response to the deal 
announcement and to test the moderating effect of deal-level analyst scrutiny on the relationship. 
Before I tested the main effects and moderating effects, I considered the possibility of 
endogeneity on media choice. Because firms anticipate the positive market reaction to their 
announcements and this expectation might affect the firm’s decision on announcement media, 
the relationship between media choice and the observed market reaction to the announcement 
could be endogeneous (Kimbrough & Louis, 2011). To account for this issue, the OLS model 
incorporated the endogeneity correction for self-selection (λ) according to Heckman (1979). This 
λ is the inverse Mills' ratio calculated based on the following probit estimation equation 
(Kimbrough & Louis, 2011): 
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where RICH MEDIA CHOICE is a dummy variable for the announcement media choice, 
coded 1for conference call or webcast use and 0 otherwise. PAYMENT_CASH captures the 
percentage of deal payment with cash. RELATIVE DEAL SIZE means the ratio of the total 
transaction value to the acquirer’s pre-announcement market value as of the beginning of the 
fiscal year. EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT is coded as 1 when the deal announcement is held 
within five days of a quarterly earnings announcement date in order to control for the effects of 
earnings releases. INDUSTRY RELATEDNESS is measured by industry relatedness between 
acquirer and target using the four-digit SIC codes of the six main lines of business (by sales) that 
the acquirer and target operate in. TARGET_ PUBLIC and TARGET_ FOREIGN are coded as 1 
when the target firm is public and foreign respectively, and 0 otherwise. ACQUIRER_MARKET 
VALUE means an acquirer’s market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year in which 
the merger is announced. BOOK TO MARKET RATIO is the ratio of an acquirer’s book value of 
equity to its market value of equity as of the beginning of the fiscal year in which the deal is 
announced. ACQUIRER_NUMBER OF ANALYSTS is the number of analysts issuing earnings 
per share forecasts for the fiscal quarter in which the deal is announced and 
ACQUIRER_ISTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP is the percentage of the acquiring firm’s stock held 
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by institutional investors at the beginning of the quarter in which the M&A is announced. 
ACQUIRER_REGULATED INDUSTRY and ACQUIRER_HIGHTECH INDUSTRY are dummy 
variables coded as 1 when acquirers are in regulated industry (two-digit SIC codes of 48 or 49) 
and high technology industry (two-digit SIC codes of 28, 35, 36, 73, or 87), respectively. Yearly 
fixed effects is measured as a dummy variable for each of the years in my sample (2005-2011). 
Appendix C shows the result of probit estimation regarding determinants of managers’ rich 
media choice for M&A announcements. 
 
. 
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IV. RESULTS 
1. Results  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for all direct effects examined in the study. 
Table 2 depicts the results from nine models for 784 deals from 2005 to 2011. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Cont’d) 
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Table 2. Results of OLS regressions predicting cumulative abnormal return on announcement day 
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Table 2. Results of OLS regressions predicting cumulative abnormal return on announcement day (Cont’d) 
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Table 2. Results of OLS regressions predicting cumulative abnormal return on announcement day (Cont’d) 
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Hypothesis 1a, 1b, and 1c predicts that an acquirer’s performance will be associated with 
deal attributes, such as the relative deal size, cash payment, and industry relatedness between 
acquirers and targets. Model 0 in table 2 is a controls-only model. Control variables, analyst 
firm-level scrutiny measured by the number of analysts following acquirers, acquirer slack, and 
target firm status are marginally significant (p < .10). Acquirers’ book to market ratio is very 
significantly associated with an acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return (p < .01). Models I, II, 
and III in Table 2 provide strong support for Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c, respectively. Relative 
deal size is significantly negatively related to the acquirer’s cumulative abnormal returns (p < 
.001). Cash payment and industry relatedness are significantly positively associated with the 
acquirer’s cumulative abnormal returns (p < .05). Before testing the moderating effect of Rich 
media choice, Model IV includes all independent variables, relative deal size, cash payment, and 
industry relatedness. Rich media choice is also added in Model V-I and inverse mill’s ratio as 
correction for self-selection (λ) in Model V-II in order to control for the endogeneity issue of 
media choice. In Model VI-I, I found that rich media choice as a moderator significantly 
strengthens the negative effect of Relative deal size on cumulative abnormal return of an 
acquiring firm (p < .001). Model VI-II adds correction for self-selection (λ) to Model VI-I and 
the moderating effect of rich media use is still significant (p < .05). The moderating effect of rich 
media use is, however, not significant on the relationship between Cash payment and an 
acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return in Model VII-I and on the relationship between Industry 
relatedness and an acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return in Model VIII-I, regardless of 
inclusion of correction for self-selection (λ).  
 In order to illustrate the effects predicted by Hypothesis 2a, I plotted the moderating 
effects of analyst scrutiny on the relationship between negative attribute, large relative deal size, 
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and acquirers’ market performance in Figure 3. Regardless of inclusion of λ in the model, 
analysts’ deal-level scrutiny measured by rich media announcements significantly exacerbates 
the negative effect of relative deal size on acquirers’ cumulative abnormal return on the deal 
announcement date and the next date. 
  
Model VI-I: OLS model without correction for self-selection (λ)  
                   
Model VI-II: OLS model with correction for self-selection (λ) 
Figure 3. A moderating effect of analyst scrutiny on the relationship between relative deal size and an 
acquirer’s market performance 
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Models VI-I and VI-II show that effect size for the interaction between relative deal size 
and rich media use is 0.013 and 0.005 (when λ is included in the model). It indicates that 1.3% 
and 0.5% of the variance in CAR is accounted for by the interaction between relative deal size 
and rich media. This effect size might be considered to be very small. However, there are two 
reasons why this is not a negligible effect size. First, a moderator, rich media use, is a categorical 
variable. According to a 30-year review (1969-1998) of the size of moderating effects of 
categorical variables, the median observed effect size is only 0.002 (Aguinis, Beaty, Boik, & 
Pierce, 2005). Second, since my sample consists of S&P 500 companies, the effect of just one 
event attribute on changes in each stock price might be relatively small. However, considering 
the volume and the price of these stocks, it is not a trivial effect. At the end of June 2015, the 
total market capitalization of S&P 500 companies was 19.29 trillion dollars. It means that 
average market capitalization of one firm on the S&P 500 list is 38.58 billion dollars, and even a 
tiny difference in its CAR generates a non-negligible impact on the stock market. 
2. Robustness Tests 
I conducted several robustness checks to assess the sensitivity of the test results to changes in 
event windows for cumulative abnormal return and models. In the OLS test, I calculated 
cumulative abnormal returns as deal performance from the announcement date to one day after 
the announcement (two-day window), using the CRSP value-weighted market index for 
benchmark portfolio. In separate analyses, I tested the same models with five different windows, 
such as (0, 0), (0, +1), (0, +2), (-1, +1), and (-3, +3). All tests with different windows showed the 
same results, except the window (0, 0). In the model with the window (0, 0), relative deal size is 
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the only significant indicator as a main effect, but the interaction effects of rich media use are 
significant on two main effects, cash payment and relative deal size. I also tested the model for a 
two-day window (0, +1) with different benchmark portfolios, such as the CRSP equally-
weighted market index and the CRSP equally weighted S&P 500 market index. All results with 
different market indices are the same with the results in the original model. I also ran analyses 
using multi-level modeling (“xtmixed” command in Stata). This test provided reassurance that 
the results are robust after controlling for firm-level effects (Appendix B) even though multi-
level modeling was not used in this research due to small intra-correlation coefficients from the 
modeling. 
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V. DISCUSSION 
1. Conclusions  
The primary objective of this study is to shed light on a role of analyst scrutiny in M&A 
announcements and its influence on investors’ decision making. In M&A announcements, 
especially via rich media, top managers intend to communicate with investors to help them to 
have a shared understanding about the focal deal and reduce perceived insecurity since the M&A 
event is accompanied by high uncertainty and ambiguity. During this process, analysts actively 
interact with managers by directly asking deal-related questions or interrogating managers’ 
motivation of M&A in order to provide investors with accurate forecasts and quality analysis 
reports of the deal. Such analyst scrutiny should be viewed as a monitoring mechanism which 
would not only reduce agency problems and information asymmetry between managers and 
investors, but also increase transparency in the information environment around the focal M&A. 
While previous literature has described how scrutiny occurs and influences the behaviors 
of managers or stakeholders at the firm-level (e.g., Rao & Sivakumar, 1999; Farrell & Whidbee, 
2002; Gentry & Shen, 2013), this study introduces analyst scrutiny at the event level and 
highlights how this event-level scrutiny functions as a moderator in the M&A context. I define 
event-level scrutiny as the analyst scrutiny the focal firm additionally faces over analysts’ firm-
level scrutiny when it announces a certain event. In this research, I controlled the effect of firm-
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level scrutiny in order to show the effects of analyst scrutiny of the focal event, not including the 
scrutiny of other events or the scrutiny the firm usually experiences. This is because all events do 
not receive the same degree of attention and each event might be exposed to a different level of 
scrutiny, depending on event attributes: Some might attract more attention, but others might not. 
Therefore, one event is associated with certain event-level scrutiny over the firm-level scrutiny. 
In M&A announcements, such event-level scrutiny occurs at the deal level. I view the 
deal announcements using rich media, such as conference calls or webcasts, as occasions when 
analysts’ vigorous deal-specific scrutiny arises. This is because managers are willing to not only 
provide more deal details and interpretations to reduce the uncertainty and ambiguity underlying 
M&A announcements, but also offer Q&A time to directly answer to analysts’ questions. This 
opportunity to collect more deal information at low cost and to directly interact with managers 
encourages analysts to scrutinize a firms’ M&A decision, and eventually increases event-level 
scrutiny of the deal. This study argues that deal-level scrutiny occurring in an acquirer’s rich 
media announcement would strengthen the effect of deal attributes on market response to the 
announcement. The empirical results, however, only support its moderating effect on the 
relationship between the negative deal attribute, relative deal size, and an acquirer’s financial 
performance. Analyst deal-level scrutiny did not significantly moderate the relationship between 
positive deal attributes, cash payment and industry relatedness, and market response. The reason 
might be that the moderating effect of analyst scrutiny at the deal level is somewhat complicated 
when a deal includes value-positive attributes. Basically investors are skeptical of a firm’s value 
creation from M&A due to the possibility of agency problems. Despite the positive sides of the 
deal, therefore, those advantages could be fully enjoyed under the certain conditions. For 
example, managers should have the capability to properly deliver all positive sides of deals and 
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to respond well to analysts’ severe questioning. Even when analysts dig up and interrogate 
managers about the details managers might miss or not recognize, managers should be able to 
lead and keep the conversation as positive as possible. If they fail to manage it, the negative 
interaction between managers and analysts might offset the good news of value-positive deals. It 
implies that the effect of conference call use on positive deal announcements might not be easily 
defined as either a positive effect or a negative effect. Another reason could be the extent of 
ambiguity underlying the deal-related information, which is expected to be solved during 
announcements. The effects of industry relatedness or cash payment are relatively obvious, 
compared to the effect of large target acquisition. Since analysts following an acquirer specialize 
in the acquirer’s industry and have a firm grasp of its cash flow, they might be able to predict the 
potential advantages and disadvantages of related acquisition or cash payment. In this case, there 
might not be much information, which would be newly revealed in managers’ rich media 
announcements. A final reason might be related to an impact of other industry attributes on 
analyst scrutiny about related acquisition. A large firm’s acquisition in the same industry usually 
draws a huge amount of analyst scrutiny as well as regulators’ attention. This amount of scrutiny 
will increase when the acquirer’s industry is highly concentrated due to antitrust concerns. On 
the other hand, the amount of scrutiny that each deal in an acquirer’s industry receives might be 
limited during the period of the frequent occurrence of M&As in the industry (c.f. Benson et al., 
2015). These industry attributes which might influence the effect of industry relatedness should 
be considered as control variables in future research. 
Although this study introduces rich media use as a new variable and measurement for the 
construct, analysts’ scrutiny at the event level, by assuming that managers’ certain announcement 
mode might trigger analyst scrutiny, I also considered another possible measurement for this 
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construct. Analysts help investors to understand the future value of the firm’s strategic decision 
by presenting accurate forecast in their research (Feldman, Gilson, & Villalonga, 2014). 
Analysts’ reputations and compensations are determined based on the accuracy of their forecasts 
and recommendations, which depends on the outcomes of analyst scrutiny about the event. From 
this perspective on analyst event-level scrutiny, I assumed that analysts would provide reports 
and recommendations as much as they are interested in the focal firms and monitor the event. If 
they have neither paid attention to nor scrutinized acquirers and their deals, they cannot 
immediately provide the analysis reports including the event news. Therefore, I collected the 
data about the number of analyst reports from Thomson One and counted the number of sell-side 
analyst reports including any information about the deal on the announcement day and one day 
after the announcement day. When I used this variable, the number of analyst reports, as a proxy 
of analyst scrutiny, the OLS model shows the same results for industry relatedness and relative 
deal size: significant moderating impact only on the relative deal size. However, regarding cash 
payment for the deal, a different result was shown: the main effect of cash payment is positive 
and the moderating effect of analyst deal-level scrutiny (measured by the number of analyst 
reports covering each deal) is also significantly positive. This alternative measure of analyst 
event-level scrutiny suggests that the original measure of event-level scrutiny, rich media use, 
might be too conservative even though two measures are positively correlated (p < .001). 
2. Limitations and Future Directions  
Before I turn to the implications and contributions of this research, I would like to note three 
limitations. First, I focused on announcements by U.S. publicly listed firms, in particular S&P 
500 companies in order to control for firm visibility or extraordinary attention to the 
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announcements. To generalize the findings, small or medium sized firms’ rich media use and its 
effects on the market response should be considered in the future study. In that case, how to 
control the attention effect of the rich media use needs to be dealt with carefully. Otherwise, the 
capability of rich media to directly interact with analysts can be clouded by the additional 
attention it brings. Second, this research did not investigate what behavioral cues or specific 
information is actually delivered through rich media. A firm’s announcement using rich media 
could deliver diverse behavioral cues, such as verbal tones, inflections, emotions, the mood, and 
the choice of words for communication. During or after the announcement, all information 
disclosed and cues would broadly and immediately reach all audiences. For Hypothesis 2a, I 
assumed that negative side of the information would trigger analysts’ interrogations and the 
negative impression from the conversation between managers and analysts might be reinforced 
by following analysts’ questioning like an echo. This mechanism can be examined in future 
research through content analysis of announcement transcripts. Finally, this research does not 
consider the effects of intense scrutiny on an individual level such as its effects on managers’ 
cognition and emotion. Scrutiny might lead managers to experience some distraction due to close 
monitoring and frequent interruptions and questioning (Sutton & Galunic, 1996). When a deal 
has especially negative characteristics or certain information which a manager might not want to 
disclose, close monitoring and frequent questioning by analysts could cause emotional burdens 
or cognitive overload on managers. Due to excessive scrutiny by analysts, managers may face 
frequent delays in ongoing tasks and be required to put forth additional effort elsewhere, away 
from the core of business activities (Sutton & Galunic, 1996). This scrutiny effects on individual 
might also negatively influence the announcement itself and destroy a firm’s value on the 
announcement date. Therefore, how such a high degree of scrutiny positively or negatively 
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influences individuals during M&A announcements and M&A performance could be studied in 
future research. 
3. Contributions  
This study makes several contributions. First, I highlight analysts’ monitoring roles in corporate 
event announcements and differentiate analyst deal-level scrutiny from firm-level scrutiny. 
While prior studies observed the firm level scrutiny measured by the number of analysts 
following focal firms and empirically tested it as a single factor of scrutiny, this study introduced 
a different angle of analyst scrutiny: at the event level. When firms announce events, they face 
firm-level scrutiny by analysts which the firms are usually exposed to, and additionally 
experience deal-level scrutiny regarding the specific deal. With this approach, I advance the 
theoretical perspective of analyst roles in market participants’ information processing about a 
firm’s M&A announcement by exploring how analyst scrutiny of specific deals occurs and 
influences the transparency of the information environment. 
Second, this research proposes that announcement media choice, especially rich media 
use, could be viewed as a proxy of deal-level scrutiny. Although managers choose announcement 
media, such as conference calls/ webcasts based on its capacity for effective and efficient 
communication of an uncertain and ambiguous message, the rich media announcement could 
also give opportunities for analysts to intensely scrutinize the deal details and acquirer mangers’ 
strategic decision. Media characteristics and the effect of media choice have been studied in the 
communication field, but those have received less attention in the management literature, even 
from behavioral strategists. This research raises an intriguing wrinkle in that argument because 
rich media use could be not only the opportunity for managers to highlight positive news but also 
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the possibility for managers to be forced to more disclose potentially harmful information than 
they intended because of analysts’ intense scrutiny. Considering this unwelcome effect of rich 
media use, this research indicates the possible risks that managers might face during 
announcements via conference calls or webcasts. It also underlines the importance of 
announcement mode choice as a part of strategic decisions made during M&A, which has been 
largely neglected in strategic management fields. 
For managers who plan for announcements of uncertain and ambiguous events, such as 
M&A, this research suggests that they should carefully choose the announcement media after 
considering event details, their capability to manage analysts’ questioning, and the possibility of 
analysts’ interrogation because of any negative attributes of the event. Since the effects of rich 
media vary depending on those factors, all event announcements might not enjoy the same 
advantages of rich media use. According to the empirical results of this study, while the effects 
of negative news delivered through rich media were amplified, good news through rich media 
does not result in additional benefits above its original impacts. In addition, under analysts’ 
severe scrutiny, unprepared or poorly organized announcements using rich media can backfire by 
disclosing unfavorable news against managers’ intention. Therefore, in uncertain and ambiguous 
situations, how to announce is as important as what to announce. 
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APPENDIX A 
MEDIA RICHNESS THEORY 
 
 
Media richness theory (Daft & Lengel, 1984, 1986; Daft et al., 1987) argues that messages 
should be communicated on channels with sufficient and appropriate media richness capacities. 
According to the theory, media vary in their ability to enable users to communicate and 
understand. Based on four categories - language variety (the ability to convey natural language 
rather than just numeric information), multiplicity of cues (the number of ways in which 
information could be communicated such as verbal tones), personalization (ability to personalize 
the message), and rapid feedback (Dennis, Fuller, & Valacich, 2008) - channels can be arrayed 
along a continuum describing their relative richness. Richer media were those with a greater 
extent in each category. The four categories determine each channel’s capacity to carry rich 
information which is more capable than lean information in terms of reducing equivocality and 
ambiguity in a message receiver. This continuum was developed to indicate the following 
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channel classifications in order of decreasing richness: (1) face-to-face, (2) telephone, (3) 
personally addressed media such as letters and memos, (4) non-personally addressed media such 
as telegrams, and (5) unaddressed media such as flyers and bulletins (Daft et al., 1987).  
Despite the fact that it has been a popular and prominent theory regarding communication 
media use in organizational settings, media richness theory has also shown the lack of 
convincing empirical support, particularly for new media, such as voice mail, e-mail, and video 
conferencing (e.g., Carlson & Zmud, 1999; Fulk & Boyd, 1991; Rice & Shook, 1990; Rice, D’ 
Ambra, & More, 1998). One explanation for the problematic findings is that most studies have 
tested perceptions of media fit rather than actual effects of media use (Dennis & Kinney, 1998). 
Dennis and Kinney (1998) found that many studies on media richness theory researched 
managers’ media choices for sending hypothetical messages while the key question of this theory 
is about whether the rich media uses for equivocal tasks improve the task performance, 
compared to the lean media uses. Another explanation is there are many factors which could 
influence media choices, other than media richness (Rice, 1992; Dennis & Valacich, 1999). 
Previous literature has shown how media choices are affected by, for example, the availability of 
media to the message sender (Rice & Shook, 1990), socially defined characteristics of media 
(Fulk, Steinfield, Schmitz, & Power, 1987), and a critical mass of certain media users (Markus, 
1987).  
Admitting the contradictory results of empirical tests on media richness theory, Dennis 
and Valacich (1999) developed media synchronicity theory and Dennis, Fuller, and Valacich 
(2008) expanded and refined the theory that communication performance depends on a fit 
between communication processes and the level of media synchronicity. According to Dennis 
and Valacich (1999)’s classification, two primary processes of communication are conveyance 
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(the dissemination of diverse new information) and convergence (the discussion of preprocessed 
information regarding each individual’s interpretation and conclusion of a situation in order to 
have a shared meaning). To achieve better communication performance, each process has a need 
for different media synchronicity, which is influenced by five capabilities, such as symbol sets, 
parallelism, transmission velocity, rehearsability, and reprocessability. Dennis, Fuller, and 
Valacich (2008) proposed that either use of high synchronicity media for convergence process or 
use of low synchronicity media for conveyance process would result in better communication 
performance.  
The initial continuum used in this study indicated four channel classifications: no media 
used for the announcement, only news releases (written documents), conference calls (audio), 
and webcasts (video). However, this study finally decided to include only two categories, only 
news release group and conference calls/webcasts group since almost all firms used at least news 
releases for the deal announcements (less than 1% of deals did not release any news articles 
about the deal), and most of webcasts had same formats with conference calls (audio only) 
except the fact that those were uploaded on the firm’s website. Therefore, lean media in this 
research means news releases and rich media indicates conference calls and webcasts. 
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APPENDIX B 
RESULTS OF MULTI-LEVEL MODELING 
Given the multi-level feature of my dataset, I tested a multilevel model of analyst scrutiny effect 
on market response. However, intra-class correlation coefficients (ICC), a measurement of how 
much correlation exists in a hierarchical dataset, were very low in all three possible types of 
multilevel models: deal level and firm level as a two-level model, deal level and industry level as 
a two-level model, and deal level, firm level and industry level as a three-level model. Before 
any predictors were included in these multilevel models, the ICCs from two level models are 
0.078 (deal level and firm level) and 0.0036 (deal level and industry level). The ICCs from three 
level model (deal nested within firm nested within industry level) are 7.41e-
19
 (at the industry 
level) and 0.078 (at the firm level). Based on these low ICCs, it is assumed that the dependent 
variable, an acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return at the deal level, does not differ across the 
firm-level or across the industry level. The results from other models including independent 
variables and a moderator also indicate low ICCs. Due to these low ICCs, the appropriateness of 
statistical analysis for multi-level modeling is not supported in this research. The following table 
shows the results of the multilevel models including deal and firm level as two-level, which 
shows the highest ICCs among three possible models. 
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APPENDIX C 
PROBIT ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR DETERMINANTS OF MANAGERS’ RICH 
MEDIA CHOICE FOR M&A ANNOUNCEMENTS 
I referred to Kimbrough and Louis (2011) to build this probit model. Considering the attributes 
of my sample construction, large firm size and missing values, however, this paper has changed 
the measurements for three variables, method of payment, private target and industry relatedness, 
to percentage of cash payment, public target, and comparison of the four-digit SIC codes of the 
six main business lines (by sales) that the acquirer and target operate in. With these 
measurements, Pseudo R
2
 of my probit model is 40.68%, indicating better model fit, compared to 
Kimbrough and Louis (2011)’s 22.15% of Pseudo R2. 
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